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U.S. Sen. John Sherman, 1823-1900

THE SHERMAN ACT AFTER A CENTURY
Thomas E. Kauper reviews the lasting legacy
of the 103- year-old Sherman Antitrust Act.
Adapted from a speech presented at the U.S. Department of Justice

A

few years ago, when I was asked to give a speech on the
impact of Sherman Antitrust Act on its lOOth anniversary,
I was tempted to give this simple answer: It has spawned a
bureaucracy and put the children of antitrust lawyers through
college. Beyond that, who knows? For in the end, we can but
speculate on how society would have differed in its absence.
But "who knows?" isn't a very satisfying answer, so in
searching for significance of the act, I looked back to an earlier
speech in which I provided a brief tour of the "greatest moments
of the Sherman Act during the preceding 20 years." In that talk, I
noted two effects felt by every American consumer - telephones
that don't always work and more televised college football games
than anyone can possibly tolerate. Among the highlights I picked
out in that speech were the Von's and Schwinn cases, the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, and, as the crowning highlight of all,
the Antitrust Division's Vertical Restraints Guidelines. Obviously, it was a speech that poked fun, and in doing so, trivialized
the impact of the Sherman Act.
In recent years, trivializing the act has become common sport,
particularly in academic circles. However, it has been done not in
good humor, but to suggest either that the act has served no social
purpose or, in the worst case scenario, has been counterproductive,
impairing the operations of American enterprises without any
benefit to consumers, business enterprises, or anyone else for that
matter. The act, in these eyes, can do only harm. Its enforcement
is a silly, trivial and expensive exercise. Such critics' evaluations
cannot simply be answered by a "who knows?" response.
Discussions of the Sherman Act often pair it with the general
idea of competition, suggesting that the two somehow go hand in
hand. Certainly we like to believe this is so. Yet there have been

times in the history of the Sherman Act when the two have
seemed to diverge; unless one gives to competition a strange
meaning, the act itself has at times been used to reach what seem
to be anti-competitive results. The significance of competition
may be one thing; the significance of the Sherman Act may be
quite another.
What has been the significance of competition to society as a
whole (a question which seems easier to deal with than the
Sherman Act itself)? To antitrust lawyers, competition means
rivalry among economic enterprises in a market. But competition
is far more pervasive in American society than that. Individuals
compete for jobs, for schools, for grades. Churches compete for
parishioners. Bureaucracies compete for funds. Through competition, we believe, the best come to the top. In the market sense,
resources are properly allocated. Throughout society, competition
preserves choice and demands accountability. It is the result of
economic liberty - a system of economic choices valued in its
own right - but perhaps more important, because it is an integral
part of the political and social liberty we cherish.

DOES COMPETITION WORK?
Do we know that competition works as advertised? Can we
actually prove the virtues of competition, or is all of this simply
an act of faith? After all, there have been both economic and
social systems which do not rest on competition as the regulator
and stimulus to achievement. Indeed, even in the United States
the value of competition has been questioned. Competition
results in both success and failure, and failure is often unaccept-
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able. It presupposes an equality of opportunity which is often lacking. Competition,
particularly at the individual level, suggests a kind of social Darwinism which many
consider destructive and counter to a democratic notion of egalitarianism.
The tension between individual liberty on the one hand and equality of individuals on
the other has been a central feature of
democracy from the beginning. This
same tension has spilled over in antitrust
decisions, particularly in the 1960s when,
in words reminiscent of the civil rights
cases of that same period, the Sherman
Act seemed to reflect a restraint on the
consequences of unbridled competition in
the name of equality. We have, in other
words, occasionally decided that too
much competition is a bad thing, and
have made the decision to temper it. We
cannot simply assume that competition always produces the outcomes society seeks.
During the Depression, competition itself was seen as a destructive process, a causative
element in the nation's economic difficulties. In more recent years, a growing body of
critics suggests that greater cooperation among enterprises and the government would
improve the position of American firms in the market place. The government, and not
competition, would choose winners and losers. While suggestions that competition is
inherently destructive or destabilizing have passed from the scene, the contention that
competition alone will not lead to optimal technological development and efficiency has
been more difficult to counter, particularly when other players in world markets don't
abide by the same rules. As markets become truly international, competition as a market
regulator becomes suspect. Some of the players may win by stacking the deck. But there
are dangers to responding in kind, not the least of which is the erosion of the economic
liberty upon which our political liberty in part depends.
Clearly our belief in the value of competition rests in part in theory, in part on the
success of American economy and the material gains it has produced, and in part on faith.
The empirical measure may best be seen in the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Communism, and to a significant extent socialism, have failed. The Soviet Union and
nations of Eastern Europe have turned in the direction of market economies, driven by the
engine of competition. They are not all likely to be wrong. Competition is valued in part
because it has provided greater prosperity and economic progress. But let us not forget that
it also tolerated, and I use that word advisedly, as the price of political freedom. The
Chinese learned, to their regret, that political freedom and economic liberty go hand in
hand. The results of competition may be harsh. They often need tempering. But no one
has yet devised a system which works better.

THE INTENT OF THE ACT
But let us take the virtues of competition and a capitalistic and free market as given.
What has been the significance of the Sherman Act? Has it done what it was meant to do,
or does it represent a promise unfulfilled? Has it done more good than harm? In the
academic world, at least, there is strong disagreement on these questions. Views on the act
are mixed, to say the least.
To some, the act may be seen as a futile gesture indeed - an intentionally futile gesture
meant only to deflect the late 19th century's growing interest in Marxism, Socialism and
other methods of curbing the use of corporate power. In these terms, the act was a success
at the moment of its enactment and has caused some degree of harm with every subsequent
action to enforce it. Historically, there is little to support this cynical view; clearly the act
was meant to have some continuing impact. But what was it to be?
Much of the considerable disagreement over the impact of the act arises out of uncertainty over what its purpose actually is (or was). While Ohio Sen. John Sherman and the
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Congress of 1890 did not like the trusts, they didn't say why. "Restraint of trade" is a
remarkably loose term. Analyses of legislative history and the common law have not been
terribly helpful. Debate has been more over what the Sherman Act's goals should be as a
policy matter than on what Congress originally meant. At various times, and to various
observers, the Sherman Act's purpose
has been described as including
consumer welfare, protection of small
business, the control of corporate and
social political power, redistribution of
wealth and simple fairness. Each of
these goals has appeared in antitrust
decisions under the act at different
periods of time.
Our inability to state the purpose of
the Sherman Act led to inconsistent
enforcement over a 100-year span,
which further complicates efforts to evaluate it. Shifts in enforcement and judicial
philosophy (and, indeed, abandonment of the act altogether in crisis), have meant that the
act has not over time fulfilled what some at any given moment expected of it. For example, the Sherman Act of the 1960s may in fact have aided small business (although this
seems unlikely). As small business ceased to be a direct concern, that protection, if any,
was lost. From a perspective of the 1990s, the Sherman Act seems to have done little to
forestall the demise of small entrepreneurs.
Those who would impart to the Sherman Act lofty social and political ambitions, who
perceive it as a bulwark against the oppression of economic and political liberty through
the centralization of private economic power, may from the perspective of today characterize it as a failure - a failure resulting from the inability or unwilling~ess of agencies and
courts to carry out its mandate. Economic concentration has increased steadily. Corporate
America seems larger today and sometimes beyond control. The individual seems lost in
the marketplace. Conversely, to those who believe the act's purpose is to protect consumer
welfare, it is at best a mixed blessing, all too often leading to enforcement actions that have
been both inappropriate and costly. Such actions have impaired efficiency and caused the
loss of sales and jobs to foreign competitors.
Views of antitrust are shaped by values and beliefs about broad issues of political and
economic power. These values are born out of tradition and our individual economic and
political philosophies. Fear of economic concentration, faith in the ability of government
to act responsibly and intelligently, and skepticism about the equation of private and public
good will lead some to seek a highly interventionist antitrust program. Such a program is,
in tum, an anathema to those whose major fear is the government and whose faith in free
markets is unshaken.
These underlying values are as much a matter of faith as demonstrable truth, however
hard we may try to wrap antitrust in the trappings of science. They are central to the
evaluation of the Sherman Act, the body of antitrust doctrine which it has spawned, and the
performance of the institutions involved in its interpretation and enforcement. Disagreements on these broad issues will not and cannot be resolved simply through the exercise of
reason.
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the Sherman Act has been an exercise
in futility, for it has in fact accomplished a great deal. It has deterred cartels, preserved
freedom of entry and set the stage for the control of market-dominating mergers. It is easy
to lose these truly major accomplishments by arguing over the peripheries. Without the
act, there can be little doubt that cartels would be commonplace, and single-fmn monopoly
would be more persistent. Perhaps cartels and monopoly would erode over time, even
without the Sherman Act (although those of us burnt by the economists' notion of contestable markets during the airline deregulation battle remain very nervous over assertions of
ease of entry).
Perhaps the amount saved has not been worth the cost. The Sherman Act has imposed
direct enforcement costs in terms of attorneys' fees, court time, litigation expenses and so
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on. It also added indirect costs in competitive conduct foregone for fear of liability and
inefficiencies imposed by rules perceived to be misguided (although those who believe the
act is to protect consumers may view resulting costs and inefficiencies as the price of social
benefits). How much in costs cartels have (or would have) imposed is unclear. Efforts at
cost-benefit analysis are necessarily doomed to failure; there is little agreement over what the
costs of monopoly are even in purely economic terms (i.e., monopoly profits or only deadweight loss). In any event, those costs cannot be measured (particularly with respect to cartels
which never occurred because of the deterrent effects of the act). Much of what some
describe as indirect costs of enforcement were the result of society conforming to its perceived purpose of the act - costs which we were prepared to incur to achieve "benefits" not
included in this equation.
The act has deterred cartels and the development of monopoly power through enforcement
actions, public and private. Perhaps it needs no further justification. But in my own view, the
act has had a significance far beyond the cartels and monopolies it has directly deterred. The
act, and the institutions it has spawned and supported, have been a steady force moving the
economy in the direction of competitive outcomes.

SYMBOL OF CAPITALISM

Thomas E. Kauper, J.D. '60, the
Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, is
an expert in property and anti-trust
law.
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The Sherman Act is a symbol of commitment to a capitalistic market economy and to the
government's proper role in checking abuses of the market. It has been the counterpoint to
direct economic regulation and the tendency of government to create and nurture monopoly
power. Without the Sherman Act and those involved in its enforcement, there may have been
no significant check on this tendency. Deregulation and the introduction of competitive
considerations into a variety of government policies may have saved the American consumer
as much as all of the Sherman Act's direct enforcement combined. It is, after all, government
which creates the most enduring market power. In totalling the benefits of the Sherman Act,
this indirect effect must be given its due. Finally, the symbolism of the Sherman Act has had
a dramatic impact outside theUnited States. The Sherman Act was not the first national
antitrust legislation, but it has been the most influential. The world has moved in our
direction. The examples are obvious: Germany, the EEC, and so on. No country has fully
imitated the act and perhaps their antitrust systems are the better for it. The act, after all, is
hardly perfect. But if our nation is best served when free market economies predominate
throughout the world, in part because economic and political liberty go hand in hand, then we
have also been well served by the Sherman Act, which perhaps more than anything else has
been the symbol of our commitment to such an economy.
In June, 1989, I attended a small conference of American and Chinese scholars who were
experts in something broadly called "economic law." It was in many ways an astonishing
event. Among other things under discussion were drafts of Chinese antitrust legislation. I
observed during the euphoria of that conference that I never thought I'd live to see the day
when China had an antitrust law. That thought turned out, I am afraid, to be prophetic.
Several hours after our Chinese colleagues boarded aircraft to begin their long journey home,
government troops entered Tianemen Square. The ideas we discussed died that night along
with the gallant young Chinese who sought only a degree of freedom. But the point of our
discussions was clear. Antitrust was necessary to preserve competition, according to our
Chinese friends; otherwise plant managers, unwilling to bear the risks a free market imposes,
would simply collaborate among themselves. But antitrust was seen as something more. It
was a powerful symbol of commitment to a market economy and to the principle that society
must keep some check on accretions of private power.
I do not know how the benefit of such symbolism can be measured. But it is real and an
important part of the benefits of the Sherman Act. Has the act been worth the costs of
enforcement and errors along the way? Surely it has, although its benefits cannot be quantified. What of the future? The impulse to cartels won't go away. Nor will the urge of
government toward monopoly. Entry will not always be free, and cartels will not inevitably
fail. The act is still needed and can accommodate new learning in the next century just as it
has in the past, if we are smart enough just to leave it alone.

